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Abstract  
As with many constructs in healthcare (e.g., ‘evidence-based medicine’, ‘health-related quality of life’, ‘decision aid’) 
‘shared decision-making’ is formative not reflective, that is, ‘it’ has no existence prior to its definition and measurement. 
Any particular formative construct is preference-sensitive, being based on the preferences of those who form it by their 
indicator selection and weighting. These preferences often reflect interests of various sorts, some material, many not (at 
least not directly), but often ones aligned with particular beliefs, ideologies or ideals. So cave litteras maiusculas - sdm not 
SDM.  Since ‘shared’ is an adjectival qualifier of ‘decision-making’, fundamental preferences relevant to decision-making 
are relevant in any construction of sdm. We highlight two major preferences in relation to health decisions. One is for 
provider-controlled, direct-to-patient intermediation (inter) as contrasted with provider-independent, direct-to-person 
apomediation (apo). The second is for verbal deliberative reasoning (vdr) as contrasted with numerical analytical 
calculation (nac). From their cross-tabulation we can see that, within both practice and research - and in legal standards and 
ethical guidelines for both - sdm is currently being constructed exclusively within the intermediative verbal deliberative 
reasoning (‘inter-vdr’) frame. We compare and contrast inter-vdr with the three other possibilities - ‘inter-nac’, ‘apo-vdr’ 
and ‘apo-nac’. Dismissal or disregard of the latter, especially the last, on the grounds of credibility and trustworthiness, 
needs to be challenged by preference-based comparative evaluations, using unbiased measurement of costs and 
effectiveness, in order to optimise the development and delivery of personalised support for health and healthcare decisions. 
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Introduction 
 
The vast and expanding literature on shared decision-
making in healthcare is a testament to its virtual 
‘motherhood and apple pie’ status, that is, it is now such a 
good thing that it cannot be seriously criticised or 
disparaged and one would be foolish to get into an 
argument about it. Concerns among healthcare 
professionals are widespread but mostly kept latent, with 
only a few serious public challenges, such as that by 
cardiologist Michel Accad:  
 
Shared decision-making was conceived as a check 
against the paternalistic attitudes of doctors. On the 
surface, it may seem to promote a dialogue between 
patients and physicians that is too frequently neglected 
when doctors are inordinately self-important. However, 
SDM only muddies the waters of clinical decision 
making and weakens the bond uniting patients and 
doctors. By diffusing responsibility - and therefore 
accountability - for medical decisions, SDM creates 
ambivalence and widens the distance between the two 
parties involved: it promotes a “hands off” attitude on 
the part of physicians while forcing on patients and their 
families a role they are neither capable of carrying out 
nor willing to take on [1]. 
 
However, the purpose here is neither to praise nor bury 
‘shared decision-making’. It is to affirm that ‘it’ does not 
and cannot exist, except as a particular manifestation of a 
latent, unobservable, formative construct [2-4] and to 
pursue the implications of this. ‘It’ does not have prior 
existence in the sense that a reflective construct, such as 
appendicitis exists and so can only be addressed and 
implemented through the indicators and indicator weights 
used by a particular person, group or organisation to 
construct it (Figure 1). It is formed in the acts of definition 
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and measurement, so there are as many shared decision-
makings as there are definitions and measures and no gold, 
or even base metal, standard definition or measure is 
possible. 
 
Figure 1 Comparison of reflective and formative 
constructs 
 
 
 
Formative constructs are essential in decision and 
policymaking. The point is not that they should not be 
used, but that selection among the various possible 
definitions and instruments is unavoidable and choosing to 
adopt and use a particular construct of (say) shared 
decision-making is a preference-sensitive decision. It is 
preference-based and, hence, given the not uncommon 
alignment of preferences and interests, often interest-
based. It is asserted that it is up to those involved in the 
promotion and implementation of a particular construct of 
shared decision-making within a publicly-funded service 
for a population with heterogeneous preferences to 
acknowledge and disclose the role of their preferences in 
choosing this form, rather than one of the alternatives. We 
repeatedly stress in what follows that there can be no 
objection to the dominance of any particular construction 
of sdm in practice and guidelines, unless it is used, either 
overtly or covertly, to deny those with other preferences 
access to alternative constructs and the decision support 
tools that would be appropriate for them. In a publicly-
resourced service the only valid arguments for denying 
these alternative forms to those who would prefer them are 
economic. There is therefore a strong case for the rigorous, 
fair and comprehensive evaluation of implementations of 
all the major constructs of sdm - evaluation in which 
particular interests and preferences (including those which 
may influence ethics committees) do not bias the measures 
of costs and effectiveness in such a way as to guarantee the 
overall result is in their favour. 
 
 
shared decision making: cave 
litteras maiusculas 
 
The rise to prominence of shared decision-making echoes 
that of evidence-based medicine. David Eddy has pointed 
out that the evidence-based movement arose primarily 
from a desire to standardise care, not to individualise it [5] 
and we now observe parallel efforts to standardise ‘patient-
centred care’ within a particular construction of ‘shared 
decision-making’, in no small part as a response to the 
criticism of standardised ‘evidence-based medicine’. But 
both constructs share the same problem. Given their 
formative nature, the pursuit of any preference-free 
conclusions about either is equivalent to hunting the 
mythical snark with a blank map [6].  
‘Shared Decision Making and Improving Health Care: 
The Answer Is Not In’ announced Victor Montori and 
colleagues in an editorial on the fifth iteration of the 
Cochrane review on SDM tools, the first of which 
appeared 16 years earlier [7]. A short summary of what 
they said will be useful to draw on: 
 
In SDM, clinicians and patients work together to 
understand the patient’s situation and determine how 
best to address it … There are at least 2 distinct types of 
SDM tools: Patient Decision Aids (PtDAs) and 
conversation aids (sometimes called within-encounter 
decision aids) … PtDAs directly assist patients in 
making their own decisions, or indirectly in preparing 
them to participate in SDM conversations with their 
clinicians … Cochrane found inconsistent effects of 
PtDAs on health care use, outcomes, and costs … 
Conversation aids are designed to directly support the 
conversations that patients and clinicians have when 
making decisions together. Their aim is to improve the 
quality of the SDM process rather than surrogate 
outcomes such as patient knowledge … Conversation 
aids for use within the clinical encounter appear to 
promote patient-clinician interactions consistent with 
SDM … When properly designed, they offer only the 
information necessary to support the patient-clinician 
conversation (the clinician can supplement information 
as needed), and demand little to no work of the patient 
before the consultation … Future research should 
discover and evaluate new ways to promote patient 
involvement in making important health care decisions 
that rely on, rather than eschew, meaningful 
conversations between patients and clinicians [7] 
(p.617). 
 
Throughout this editorial sdm is treated as a single 
construct - ‘SDM’ -  various implementations of which, 
and tools for which, can be the subject of reviews, analyses 
and meta-analyses, employing a variety of methodologies. 
This construction of sdm has the sharing occurring within 
the clinician and patient dyad, ruling out any sharing 
between the person and other people or sources, in 
addition to (possibly) the clinician. Crucially, the explicit 
aim of the aid is seen as being to improve ‘the quality of 
the SDM process’, not to improve the quality of the 
decision, which is not mentioned. The idea of any 
significant disconnect between these two qualities is 
clearly not contemplated. 
Even those who have major doubts about what is to 
count as shared decision-making continue to treat it as if it 
is a single construct. As a recent excellent example, Maria 
Clayman, Pår Gulbrandsen and colleagues seek to widen 
its scope, freeing it from what they see as the medical-
encounter-centricity in which the sharing occurs between 
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‘the patient in the clinic’ and the healthcare professional, 
and the decision is about health, or, more likely, illness 
[8,9]. They want to broaden, deepen and lengthen the 
construct of sdm so that it focuses on ‘the person in the 
world’, giving it a more external, social relationship-
centric, focus. The whole human being - person not patient 
- is to be seen as making - and sharing - existential 
decisions within their living set of relationships. The 
relationship with the healthcare professional is a very 
important one, but one of many within this much expanded 
context. Moving to ‘the person in the clinic’ is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, change. 
A more radical version of this suggestion, by 
Gulbrandsen and Gerwing, involves abandoning the term 
sdm altogether, replacing the verb ‘sharing’ by 
‘contextualising’ and referring only to ‘contextualising 
decisions’ [10]. However, this would merely replace one 
monistic construct with another, continuing the pursuit of 
an unattainable umbrella definition and measure covering 
multiple constructs. 
The debates segue between what is to count as sdm and 
how it is to be counted. Again, we observe most 
contributions to the topic assume the existence of a single 
underlying construct. In a Norwegian study that Clayman 
and colleagues cite with approval, Noralie Geessink et al. 
[11] note that in recent years:  
 
… several new observer instruments covering different 
parts and perspectives on the SDM concept have been 
developed. It has been suggested that SDM should be 
seen in the context of broader communication skills and 
investigated by taking into account the entire clinical 
encounter or even centred on the person rather than the 
clinical encounter [11] (p.1768). (italicization mine) 
 
As a result of their monistic conception of sdm, the 
researchers administered several measures that have been 
proposed as relevant to sdm - OPTION 5 and 12, SDM-Q-
9, Visual Analogue Scale for Involvement (VAS-I), 
MAPPIN’SDM - and compared the results. However, 
while such comparisons may be of interest to decision-
makers faced with the task of selecting one to use from 
among them, these instruments generate measures of 
different constructs of sdm, not different measures of 
‘sdm’. 
The simple point here is this: shared decision-making 
does not exist except as a socially-constructed field of 
inquiry and activity. Hence cave litteras maiusculas: in a 
one-off attempt to draw attention to this reification this 
paper does not use initial capitals, or the alphabetism 
‘SDM’, and abbreviate shared decision-making to sdm 
(i.e., all lower case). The same applies to other formative 
constructs mentioned. This is not an attempt - which would 
be forlorn - to stop this styling. Nor is it a criticism of the 
setting up of societies or centres, with this capitalised label, 
in order to research the topic of sdm or implement an 
activity under this label. This can legitimately happen, as it 
does or could with thousands of other topics, such as 
‘Shared Holiday Making’, ‘Shared Meal Making’ or 
‘Shared Love Making’. It is simply intended to visually 
reinforce the point that such reification of formative 
constructs is far from harmless. Beyond the formal reasons 
for being alert to the ontological transgression involved, 
notably the improper psychometric validation of 
instruments by Cronbach’s alpha [12], it can easily mask 
anti-pluralist attempts to impose particular definitions and 
measures in the material and/or ideological interests of 
some stakeholders. ‘Stakeholders’, by definition, have 
‘skin in the game’, which is both desirable and 
problematic. Formative constructs require a pluralism that 
is currently too rare in all sectors of healthcare. This 
includes applied research, where, despite asseverations to 
the contrary regarding the virtues of multi-disciplinary 
collaboration, silos are ruthlessly competitive in the search 
for funding, publications and promotions. In these 
competitions, having one’s preferred form of a construct 
established as the dominant one, ideally written into law, 
as in Washington state (https://www.hca.wa.gov/about-
hca/healthier-washington/patient-decision-aids-pdas#what-
pdas-has-hca-certified), can be a major weapon, as well as 
a source of publication bias.  It would be more appropriate 
- and ethical - to interpret contributions to the debate on the 
topic of sdm as arguing for additions to the portfolio of 
constructs gathered under that label, rather than as calls to 
revise a single construct, implicitly and inappropriately 
treated as reflective, for which a universal standardised 
measure is the holy grail.  
This is not to suggest that widespread agreement on, 
and development of standards for, particular constructs of 
sdm is to be opposed. Indeed, as already stated, these are 
essential, as is most evidently the case with the various 
generic constructs - and hence various measures - of 
‘health-related quality of life (hrqol)’. The key point is that 
each of the latter is explicitly based on a set of group 
preferences or ‘tariff’ for different sets of items or 
domains. It is attempts to impose, imply, or even 
contemplate a universal standard for a formative construct 
such as sdm or hrqol, thereby denying its inherent 
preference-sensitivity, that should be resisted, because of 
the potential harms. These potential harms arise from a 
decision-maker not having available the particular 
construct that would be most appropriate, given their 
preferences. It follows that choice from a menu of sdm 
constructs should not only be preserved, but facilitated, in 
order to prevent control of the menu by those pursuing 
particular ideologies or interests, however well-
intentioned. This pluralism will encounter resistance, 
mainly covert, as a result of the conflicts of interest of 
stakeholders, frequently material, but often, and equally if 
not more important, professional and/or ideological. 
Interpreting such interests as merely attitudinal or cultural 
‘barriers’ or ‘obstacles’ to be overcome [13,14] overlooks 
their more fundamental bases and underestimates the 
magnitude of the challenge they pose. It also distracts from 
addressing these fundamental bases directly, the first task 
in which is to establish the nature of the alternative 
constructs of sdm.  
 
 
decision making 
 
It is both interesting and relevant that the topic of shared 
decision-making has become such a major source of 
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interest and activity, given that decision-making processes, 
especially more analytic approaches to decision-making, 
have never been a significant concern of the healthcare 
professions, as exemplified in its continuing absence from 
medical education and training [15] and the well-
documented consequences of this [16]. It would not be 
unfair to suggest that the medical profession has become 
seriously interested in decision-making processes, beyond 
expertise- and experience-based ‘taking into account’ and 
‘clinical judgement’ modes, only since the need to ‘share’ 
has arisen from external demands for more ‘patient-
centred’ and ‘user-engaged’ care. Demands now given 
increased force by the explicit and transparent elicitation 
and integration of patient preferences mandated by the 
Montgomery legal ruling (see later). 
Since ‘shared’ is an adjectival qualifier of ‘decision-
making’, fundamental preferences relevant to decision-
making are relevant in any construction of sdm. Two major 
ones may be highlighted here in relation to health decision-
making, within which healthcare/service decision-making 
is a subcomponent. One is for provider-controlled, direct-
to-patient intermediation in contrast to provider-
independent, direct-to-person apomediation. The other is 
for verbal deliberative reasoning (vdr) in contrast to   
numerical analytical calculation (nac). The second 
distinction contrasts ‘verbal’ and ‘numerical’, rather than 
‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’, because qualitative 
approaches necessarily involve quantifying magnitudes, 
simply preferring to use verbal quantifiers rather than 
numerical ones.  
In the cross-tabulation of the two distinctions in a 2 by 
2 matrix it is clear that current sdm activity, both research 
and practice, occurs within the frame of intermediation 
involving verbal deliberative reasoning (‘inter-vdr sdm’ for 
short). Before proceeding to elaborate on this and the other 
the three cells of the matrix, the message of the previous 
section is re-emphasised. Use of a particular construct of 
sdm within any of these four frames is acceptable, subject 
to it being acknowledged as a preference-sensitive choice - 
not to be regarded or presented as the way to implement 
sdm, or even as the best way to implement it, as opposed to 
one based on specific preferences drawn from a set of 
heterogeneous possibilities. Failure to highlight this is a 
sign that particular interests and/or ideologies may be 
being protected, with or without self-awareness of those 
involved. In many cases these interests can be quite 
legitimately defended, so the only requirement is that they 
be disclosed and defended as preferences, not taken for 
granted as being ‘the right way’ on apparently value-free 
grounds. The key differences between the four constructs  
can be best established by reference to the origins, location 
and type of decision support that is - or is not - involved. 
We generalise mainly on the basis of the range of decision 
aids in the Ottawa inventory 
[https://decisionaid.ohri.ca/AZlist.html], though note that 
this inventory is itself based on a particular set of 
preferences regarding the preference-sensitive formative 
construct ‘decision aid’. 
Following Gunther Eysenbach [17], decision support is 
‘apomediative’ when the resources involved are produced 
independently of the provider of the good or service in 
question (apo = away from) and are delivered ‘direct to the 
person/citizen/consumer/user’ in the community. Familiar 
examples of apomediative decision support resources, 
based on informal multi-criteria decision analytic models, 
are the proliferating product and service comparison 
websites, such as ‘Which’ in the UK, ‘Consumer Reports’ 
in the US, ‘Choice’ in Australia, and ‘Taenk’ in Denmark. 
Apomediation is distinguished from ‘intermediation,’ 
where the provider develops and delivers a decision 
support resource on the basis of their perceptions and 
preference-based decisions as to what the patient will 
benefit from, as well as their (in)ability or (un)willingness 
to deliver options that could potentially be covered in the 
resource. Intermediation is not provider-independent and 
the options and criteria that would be present in an 
apomediative aid may be censored or filtered on the basis 
of the beliefs, values, interests and procedures of providers 
- and any other stakeholders involved in intermediative 
decision aid development. Open access decision support 
tools, which constitute the main type of apomediative 
resource, eschew such option and criteria censoring or 
filtering, seeking to supply high-quality independent 
guidance, without conflicts of interest of any sort. The 
apomediative tool will be designed to incorporate all the 
functional criteria of interest to the person, not only, or 
mainly, the ‘clinical’ ones of interest to the provider (e.g., 
bio or other markers). 
Apomediation is also to be distinguished from ‘dis-
intermediation,’ where the individual, often a dissatisfied 
patient, bypasses healthcare providers in an attempt to find 
what they want, for example, by doing anonymous internet 
searches. Apomediation can be seen as acknowledging 
some of the motivations underlying dis-intermediation, but 
seeking to supply a better alternative to Dr Google - one 
which will be superior, or inferior, to intermediation 
depending on the preferences of the person. If engagement 
with an apomediative aid results in a decision to contact a 
healthcare professional, which will sometimes be the case, 
we have the possibility of hybrid ‘apo-intermediation’. 
However, in this case the clinician will engage with the 
empowered person in a way that is very different from that 
which would characterise pure intermediative engagement 
with a dependent patient. They will need to be prepared to 
discuss options in the apomediative tool that may not have 
appeared in an intermediative aid for the same decision. 
For instance, a provider may have been unwilling to 
include options in an intermediative aid for which their 
procedures require a test or scan result. In some places in 
Denmark, as just one example, prescription of any 
medication for the primary prevention of fragility fractures 
requires a DXA scan. 
Apomediation does not deny that the clinician may 
know, or be able to access or acquire, more information 
about the person than is available prior to a consultation. 
But neither does it assume that this extra information 
would change the preference-based opinion of the 
apomediative decision support tool if it were to be 
incorporated - as it can be in the apo-intermediative 
context. The tool will routinely warn that 
contraindications, unknown to the user, may emerge. 
Apomediation does not accept the idea of ‘lines of 
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treatment’, since any necessary trade-offs between 
effectiveness, side effects/toxicity  and other criteria are to 
be made by the individual person in the decision 
supporting process, not pre-empted in guidelines at the 
service or practice level. Cost-effectiveness becomes the 
only legitimate basis for lines in the providing or denying 
of an intervention to a particular person or group in a 
resource-constrained service. Apomediative decision 
support tools will not include this as a criterion, but 
normally alert the person to the possibility of option denial 
on this basis, leaving it to the provider to implement it.  
To avoid lengthy repetition, from this point we may 
abbreviate the four high-level types of sdm construct as 
follows:1 
 
• inter-vdr = intermediation via verbal deliberative 
reasoning 
 
• inter-nac = intermediation via numerical analytic 
calculation 
 
• apo-vdr = apomediation via verbal deliberative 
reasoning 
 
• apo-nac = apomediation via numerical analytic 
calculation 
 
 
inter-vdr sdm 
 
With the rare exceptions introduced in the following 
section, intermediative decision support is achieved 
through aids embedded in a decision-making process 
characterised by verbal deliberative reasoning. Numbers 
may be presented to communicate information about one 
or two major risks (often in visual form, such as in 
frequency displays of happy and sad faces), but most 
magnitudes are quantified verbally (e.g., ‘few’, ‘many’, 
‘rare’ ‘some’). Occasionally, there is quantification of the 
individual’s preferences, but usually in verbal form. 
Synthesis of personalised evidence and personal 
preferences into a score for each of the various options is 
therefore impossible. In any case, this type of aid is not 
intended to produce a preliminary opinion and indeed it is 
usually made clear that it is deliberately avoiding doing so, 
in order not to interfere with the intuitive ‘making up of 
mind’ process that is assumed to be the correct one. 
The seminal papers by Cathy Charles, Amiram Gafni, 
Tim Whelan and others, of which only two are cited here 
[18,19],  are focused exclusively on ‘it takes two to tango’ 
inter-vdr sdm. Implementations of this construction of sdm 
typically incorporate aids designed to be used only in a 
clinical consultation,  as ‘encounter aids’, though they are 
sometimes made available to the patient offsite or online as 
preparation for the encounter.  
The recent review of encounter / inter-vdr aids by 
Scalia and colleagues covered 23 RCTs and 30 non-
randomized studies [20]. In line with most previous 
                                                          
1 A short video introducing these constructs is available at 
https://youtu.be/GxootSa1GC4. 
findings they concluded that such aids signiﬁcantly 
increased knowledge, lowered decisional conﬂict, 
increased observational-based assessment of shared 
decision-making and satisfaction with the decision-making 
process, all without increasing visit durations. But while 
‘the narrative synthesis showed that encounter tools have 
high utility for patients and clinicians … important barriers 
to implementation exist (i.e., time constraints) at the 
clinical and organizational level’. Examples of the 
included aids included were those produced within the 
Mayo unit [21], those of the Option Grid collaborative, 
now taken over by EBSCO [22]. But not the NICE 
decision aids [23].  
We can now add those under development within the 
recent organisation-wide adoption of sdm in the Patients’ 
Cancer Hospital in Vejle, Denmark [24]:  
 
Establishing SDM was, and is, a central tenet of this 
vision, leading to the creation of a Centre for Shared 
Decision-Making in 2014 …  directed by an oncologist 
on the hospital staff … The Centre’s leadership 
identified five factors likely to be instrumental in 
effectively implementing SDM across an organization - 
(1) leadership: organizational, clinical and patient 
leaders who will champion and facilitate SDM, 
including practical support to overcome obstacles; (2) 
skills development: awareness building, preparation, 
training and support for clinicians and patients; (3) tools: 
availability of patient decision aids and other materials 
to support SDM, together with a means of embedding 
them into clinical pathways to ensure ease of use; (4) 
performance measures: instruments for monitoring 
effect on decision quality and patient outcomes and (5) 
proof of concept: demonstration projects and evidence 
that SDM can be beneficial in the local context. 
 
… the Centre developed criteria that all decision aids 
should meet: Present the options; structure the 
conversation; encourage dialogue on what matters most 
to patients; offer balanced information, including 
relevant statistics on pros and cons of specific options; 
include patient stories; and guide a shared decision in 
the end. Designer involvement and design research have 
led to the generous use of icons and illustrations, and 
minimal use of written words, in the Centre’s series of 
decision aids developed thus far. The decision aids are 
in-consultation tools for the use of clinicians and 
patients together. … The decision aid is in paper format 
because the patients preferred a tangible tool that they 
can review rather than a digital version or application 
which they found harder to use [24] (pp. 230,233). 
 
It seems unlikely that this last point was true of all 
patients, even if it was a majority view and no evidence is 
produced on the claim. The presentation of such an 
unqualified generalisation suggests a possible reluctance to 
admit preference heterogeneity in relation to decision aids. 
It mirrors the failure to acknowledge that the construct of 
shared decision-making being implemented is a 
preference-based one. The quotation confirms that, to have 
any chance of success, the Vejle initiative had to meet the 
preferences of affected stakeholders, which, within a 
hospital, unsurprisingly mandated an inter-vdr frame. The 
published description and design of the Vejle decision aids, 
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in their virtually complete rejection of numbers, let alone 
anything approaching calculation, confirms this. 
As mentioned earlier, Clayman and colleagues [8,9] see 
the narrow focus on the individual patient’s autonomy in 
mainstream sdm as undesirable for several reasons: it 
excludes many facets of the roles, actions and influences of 
family members in decision-making; focuses solely on the 
medical encounter; ignores the informational environment 
to which patients have access and treats each encounter as 
independent of all others. While contemplating adding 
some elements of apomediation - consultation with family, 
friends and others who are not healthcare providers or 
professionals - they remain within the inter-vdr frame of 
sdm because the healthcare professional is still at centre 
stage, albeit now tasked with sharing decision-making with 
‘the person in the world’. Incidentally, Clayman et al. 
[8,9], by omission, do not see decision aids as playing a 
significant role in this sharing. This may reflect their 
expressed wish to avoid the concept of a crunch ‘moment 
of decision’, whether in the consultation, or before or after 
it. 
The current dominance of inter-vdr sdm is not 
surprising given that the core course ‘Introduction to 
Shared Decision Making and Patient Decision Aids’ 
provided by the leading society in the field, the Society for 
Medical Decision Making (SMDM), is restricted to it [25]. 
It makes no acknowledgement that this a preference-based 
choice and no materials relating to other constructs is 
provided: 
 
Shared decision making provides a model for patients 
and their clinicians to engage in a deliberative, 
communicative process about health decisions in which 
there is no clear best option from an evidence 
standpoint.  
 
This statement is highly contentious in itself, implying 
an unacceptable ignoring of the preference inputs into 
decisions, since the evidence alone can never establish ‘a 
clear best option’. Clinician equipoise based on population 
level evidence cannot ethically be translated into an 
assumption of personalised decisional equipoise and this is 
an ever-present danger in inter-vdr. What is more 
surprising, given that one of the other key SMDM core 
courses is an ‘Introduction to Medical Decision Analysis 
(Decision-Analytic Modeling)’, is the complete disconnect 
between it and that on sdm, which refers exclusively to 
inter-vdr with no mention of decision analysis or of any 
sort of numerical analytic calculation. The treatment of 
sdm as a single (inter-vdr) construct permeates the 
presentation of the course:  
 
… participants will learn the basics about shared 
decision making including why it is important, how it 
differs from other related clinical tools … and what 
shared decision making has been proven to do (and not 
do). We will also discuss how shared decision making 
occurs in practice, particularly how it can be improved 
in patient-physician discussions and how risk 
communication methods can improve decision making.  
 
 
inter-nac sdm 
 
The possibility of intermediation involving numerical 
analytic calculation was pursued over some decades by 
James Dolan, using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
implementation of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA) [26]: 
 
… the steps involved in using a multi-criteria method 
are analogous to the essential elements of a shared 
decision-making process. This similarity suggests that 
multi-criteria methods can be used as the basis for a new 
generation of clinical decision support systems that will 
facilitate the clinical implementation of high quality 
shared decision-making… To effectively implement 
clinical shared decision making, it is especially 
important to identify and discuss differences in values 
and preferences and their effect on medical decisions 
because we know that in many cases the decision 
priorities of doctors and patients differ . The 
development of methods that will promote efficient and 
effective communication among all involved 
stakeholders is, therefore, a high priority topic for shared 
decision-making research … [26] (p.419). 
 
Despite favourable trials of aids including ones for 
gastrointestinal bleeding, management of neonatal group B 
streptococcal sepsis, and colorectal cancer screening, this 
work has had little impact at the clinical level. The 
complexity of AHP and especially of the unique pairwise 
comparison method used to establish criteria importance 
weights and performance ratings, may be contributing 
factors, although Dolan found that the majority of patients 
in the AHP group were ‘able to complete the analysis 
without difficulty and indicated that they liked the 
experience and thought it should be used routinely.’ 
However, there has been a development of great 
potential significance for inter-nac recently in the 
development and successful feasibility testing of a 
personalised evidence-based ‘health-optimization system’ 
based on the frameworks of shared decision-making and 
multi-criteria decision analysis [27]. According to Eiring 
and colleagues [27], it enables patients, clinicians, and 
caregivers to collaborate in optimizing the patient’s health 
on a shared platform. A crucial feature enables patients and 
clinicians to explore the likely value of treatments based on 
mathematical integration of self-reported and research data 
and the patient’s preferences. A comparison of the system 
with current standards for clinical practice guidelines and 
patient decision aids was performed, revealing that 18 out 
of 23 components of the system were not required in the 
prevailing international standard for patient decision aids. 
This can be taken as clear confirmation of the danger of 
seeking universal standards for such systems, when they 
are dominated by the inter-vdr construction of sdm. 
There seems little doubt that the lack of resources being 
put into developing and trialing inter-nac decision support 
comes from those with preferences favouring ‘vdr sdm’. 
Among other preferences, these include the wish to avoid  
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Figure 2 Comparison of Annalisa output screens for Taenk coffee machine comparison and fragility 
fracture decision support tool 
 
 
 
 
the complete separation of preferences and evidence 
mandatory in MCDA, to avoid their algorithmic synthesis 
into a numerical score (opinion) for each option, and to 
avoid the consequent potential exposure of, and need to 
accept and resolve, dyadic discordance. In contrast, 
proponents of nac prefer to avoid the confounding of 
preferences and evidence almost inevitable in vdr; prefer to 
see the result of the algorithmic synthesis of preferences 
and evidence in a numerical score (opinion) for each 
option and prefer to expose, discuss and transparently 
resolve any dyadic discordance. 
 
 
apo-vdr sdm 
 
It might appear that the increasing number of decision aids 
made available by organisations and groups such as those 
on public access produced by NICE [23] constitute this 
form of sdm. However, while they may indeed be of high 
quality, most do not meet the fundamental criterion of 
apomediation, that is, provider-independence. NICE is 
officially an independent ‘non-Departmental Public Body’ 
but in all key respects it is part of the NHS. Patient-based 
social media groups and societies, which in principle 
constitute a form of apomediation, usually have major 
inputs from professionals and providers - indeed usually 
feature this as a major attraction - so are also in breach of 
this condition. We can therefore offer no specific example 
for the apo-vdr construct of sdm.  
The reader will recall that we are talking of preferences 
here, so those who find apo-vdr or inter-nac unattractive, 
unwise or objectionable, are fully entitled to express their 
preference in favour of inter-vdr. But that is the grounding 
of their position. In case there is any doubt, this point 
applies equally to the fourth and final high-level construct 
of sdm. 
 
 
apo-nac sdm 
 
As signified by its apomediative appellation, this differs 
from the ‘inter-nac’ approach above in its origins and 
intended audience. The case for including it in the basic 
menu of sdm constructs is essentially the same:  
 
The analysis-based approach has one compelling 
advantage in the provision of patient/person-centred care 
and genuinely shared decision making. In its 
multicriteria form, decision analysis provides a generic 
approach to all decisions, that is, it is not condition-
specific and does not mandate the reasoning expertise 
and knowledge acquisition in the particular area (e.g. a 
disease) required to follow and share expertise-based 
prescriptions. As long as expertise-based prescription is 
the sole basis of the clinical encounter, patient 
empowerment will be a very difficult and demanding 
task. An MCDA-based approach allows the 
person/patient to input their preferences as importance 
weights for criteria in a straightforward manner and to 
have them transparently combined with the published 
evidence and the clinician’s expertise [28] (p.5). 
 
Interestingly, the basic principles and processes of 
MCDA are endorsed by many people when asked how a 
decision should be made, even though they may follow its 
principles and processes only as consumers of goods and 
services. They have had no opportunity to experience it in 
relation to health and healthcare, except in relation to non-
prescription items such as fish oil, headache pills and other 
over-the-counter products. Salkeld et al., have successfully 
trialed an apo-nac aid [29] and in a recent research project 
used the output on 18 coffee machines from the Danish 
consumer council comparison website (taenk.dk) as a 
‘warm-up’ for a decision support tool comparing 17 
options for the primary prevention of fragility fractures 
(Figure 2). 
Within MCDA, there are lower-level preference-based 
choices of construct to be made. For example, in contrast 
to the AHP, Annalisa adopts the simple and colloquially 
familiar ‘weighted-sum’ approach; all attributes exist at the 
same level (there is no hierarchy of criteria and sub-
criteria); the performance of each option is directly rated 
on each attribute; the importance of each attribute is 
directly weighted in relation to that of all the mother 
attributes (no pairwise comparisons) and the option scores 
are their expected values calculated by summing an 
option’s ratings on each attribute multiplied by the 
attribute’s importance weighting. 
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Given that the selection of a decision procedure or 
decision support system to adopt involves multiple criteria 
and is therefore preference-sensitive, it does not make 
sense to ask whether any particular instantiation ‘works’ in 
some overall or average sense as the basis of a clinical 
decision support system. The answer will vary as a 
function of the particular decision maker’s preferences in 
the particular context as well as the quality of the 
instantiation. 
In apo-nac sdm, ‘sharing’ is with a maximally 
independent organisation, not a healthcare provider. This 
form of sdm will be attractive to that section of the 
population whose preferences reflect concerns - extending 
to distrust - about the ‘medical-industrial complex’ and the 
potential harms it creates, including overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment arising from ‘disease mongering’. The need 
for provider independence has become particularly obvious 
in cases such as screening, where the population health 
aims of a health service often lead to the presentation of 
the harms and benefits in a way that will increase uptake, 
rather than facilitate the optimization of an individual’s 
decision. The fundamental clash between these two aims is 
not fudged in genuinely person and citizen-centred care - 
or in apomediative approaches. Attempts within the 
healthcare professions to address such problems as ‘too 
much medicine’ are to be admired, but are inevitably 
restricted by professional commitments and loyalties.  
An autonomous person may prefer to engage with the 
decision support provided in apo-nac sdm to decide 
whether or not to engage with a health provider. If they 
decide to so engage, they will enter the ‘apo-inter 
mediative’ clinical encounter empowered by ‘getting a 
second opinion first’.  
In an attempt to assist decision makers in making this 
decision we have developed a decision support tool that 
can be used in either setting. To test a demo version go to 
survey 1498 at https://ale.rsyd.dk. The tool is introduced in 
[30]. 
Clinical expertise has an important place in the 
development of apo-nac tools. In the same way as a 
‘Taenk’ evaluation of coffee machines draws on technical 
experts to rate the performance of the various products, 
apo-nac decision support tools will draw on the expertise 
of healthcare professionals for their expert estimates of the 
performance rates of options on criteria where the 
evidential base is weak or non-existent. However, they will 
have no role in providing either preferences or overall 
option evaluations, since these are generated in the apo-nac 
engagement process. 
Numerous examples of how apomediative decision 
support tools can be developed, either as translations of 
intermediative decision aids or direct from research 
studies, are available at http://cafeannalisa.org.uk.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
According to David Eddy, evidence-based medicine 
emerged to challenge medicine’s complacency. That 
complacency reflected a fundamental assumption: 
 
… that through the rigors of medical education, 
followed by continuing education, journals, individual 
experiences, and exposure to colleagues, each physician 
always thought the right thoughts and did the right 
things. The idea was that when a physician faced a 
patient, by some fundamentally human process called 
the “art of medicine” or “clinical judgment,” the 
physician would synthesize all of the important 
information about the patient, relevant research, and 
experiences with previous patients to determine the best 
course of action. “Medical decision making” as a field 
worthy of study did not exist. Analytical methods and 
mathematical models were limited to research projects. 
Guidelines were merely a way for experts to pass 
occasional pieces of advice to nonexperts ... Diseases 
did not require any management beyond what physicians 
were already providing, and performance was taken for 
granted … informal guidelines were playing an essential 
role in medicine by simplifying decisions to a point 
manageable by busy physicians. However, when they 
were tracked back to their origins, it became clear that 
they were simply the beliefs of the authors, or at best a 
consensus of experts. In none of the cases was there an 
explicit rationale tied to evidence … [5] (p.1). 
 
The perceived successes of ebm in challenging this 
complacency have actually been a major factor in the 
emergence of sdm as a way of overcoming its group level 
option evaluations, which are inappropriate for person-
centred individual decision-making [31].  
How do the various constructs of sdm within each of 
the above frames measure up legally and ethically? A key 
development in this respect is the recent Montgomery 
ruling in the UK, which seems likely to be followed 
elsewhere. 
According to Chan and colleagues [32], the 
Montgomery ruling:  
 
… established that, rather than being a matter for clinical 
judgment to be assessed by professional medical 
opinion, a patient should be told whatever they want to 
know, not what the doctor thinks they should be told … 
it redefined the standard for informed consent and 
disclosure [from] whether a doctor’s conduct would be 
supported by a responsible body of clinicians … [to] 
establishing a duty of care to warn of material risks … 
[here] the test of materiality [is] whether “a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should 
reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be 
likely to attach significance to it [32] (p.1). 
 
… the ethical and legal position is clear: doctors must 
not withhold information simply because they disagree 
with the decision the patient is likely to make if given 
that information. The doctor’s duty is simply to treat 
patients according to their interests, which might include 
being given more information than usual … the 
difficulties of conveying information about treatment 
and risks should not be taken to indicate that patients are 
incapable of understanding medical information or that 
patient autonomy in decision making is meaningless 
[32] (p.2). 
 
Dowie 
 
sdm is a preference-sensitive formative construct 
 
514 
While constructs within each of the four high-level 
types of sdm are potentially capable of meeting this 
‘reasonable patient’ standard, inter-vdr constructs will have 
more difficulty providing the basic documentation required 
to defend a case, especially when this relates to 
information about options not included in the 
intermediative decision aid. A nac form of sdm, 
particularly an apo-one based on MCDA, will immediately 
and explicitly confirm that the benefits and harms to the 
individual person have been assessed, using their 
preferences in relation to what is important in combination 
with the best available evidence and clinician estimates of 
the option effects and side effects. 
There are aspects of the Montgomery ruling which blur 
the line between the legal ‘reasonable patient’ standard and 
the ethical ‘actual patient’ standard (‘subjective patient’ in 
legal terminology). But whatever the case law is held to be 
at any moment, the clinician has an ethical responsibility to 
the individual person that extends beyond any legal 
requirement. 
Ethical discussions are frequently unsatisfactory 
because of the reluctance of the participants to specify how 
they will, in practice decisions, reconcile the inevitably 
competing demands of observing rights and duties on the 
one hand and taking account of consequences (including 
resourcing ones) on the other. Whether they are 
fundamentally deontologists (roughly doing right is doing 
good) or consequentialists (roughly doing good is doing 
right), many are likely to deny that their adherence to one 
of these positions - or some blend of them -  is 
fundamentally a preference-based value judgment. What 
we can say about our four high-level types of sdm 
constructs is that there is nothing inherently unethical 
within any of them. The quality of an apo-nac aid may not 
be high by normative standards  - its transparency makes 
this relatively easy to assess - but then the quality of inter-
vdr sdm cannot simply be assumed to be high either - and 
its lack of transparency makes it very difficult to assess.  
Research suggests there are ‘many miles to go’ in the 
implementation, both inter- and intra-culturally of inter-vdr 
decision aids [13]. Current attempts to reduce the ‘barriers’ 
and ‘obstacles’ focus on changing the attitudes, 
interpretations, and resources of clinicians, patients and 
administrators. However, while asymmetries of power are 
acknowledged [33] the material and non-material interests 
underlying these should not be underestimated. 
Maria Clayman anthropomorphises sdm as a single 
person: 
 
... research on SDM and patient engagement in 
healthcare is in its adolescence: it has emerged but is not 
quite a mature field ... As with many other types of 
interventions, there is a clear and pressing need for 
research into SDM’s implementation, dissemination, and 
sustainability ... An adolsecent sitting at the intersection 
of evidence-based medicine, health communication, and 
cognitive psychology, SDM appears to be on the verge 
of transformation into its own, unique field of inquiry ... 
A lingering problem for the field is that SDM is 
measured in myriad ways [34] (p.1723). 
 
We can applaud the insights of Clayman and her 
colleagues into shared decision-making, while 
simultaneously pointing out that they do not address the 
above key distinctions in decision-making. Apomediation 
supplies the wider and more extended possibilities they 
seek, so it is crucial to see that when we endorse much of 
the Clayman-Gulbrandsen argument it is because, like 
them, we prefer a different construct of sdm to the 
mainstream, clinic-centric one. However, they do not see it 
that way and, in trying to broaden, deepen and lengthen the 
monistic construct of sdm and stop it being measured in a 
myriad of ways, they are fundamentally limited by the idea 
that there is a thing called ‘SDM’. 
In the 2018 fifth iteration of the Cochrane systematic 
review of interventions for increasing the use of shared 
decision-making by healthcare professionals, it was 
concluded (on the basis of 87 studies, 45,641 patients and 
3113 healthcare professionals) that it is uncertain whether 
any interventions of any type for increasing use of SDM by 
healthcare professionals (targeting either professionals, 
patients or both) are effective in increasing the use of SDM 
[35]. The reason provided for this uncertainty is that the 
certainty of the evidence is low or very low. The 
possibility that the problem is inherent in the attempt to 
arrive at conclusions regarding multiple constructs of sdm 
is not seriously contemplated. 
The qualitative study of Savelberg and colleagues in 
the context of breast cancer care [36] highlights the current 
difficulties clinicians have in engaging in inter-vdr sdm 
constructed in the well-publicised  ‘choice talk’-‘option 
talk’- ‘decision talk’ sequence [37]: 
 
Most clinicians primarily focused on the ﬁrst steps of 
SDM ignoring preference and decision talk. The 
remaining steps, like the uptake of the Patient Decision 
Aid in the clinical pathway, were regarded as 
challenging, with surgeons, intentionally or 
unconsciously, delegating this responsibility to nurses. 
One barrier to successfully implementing SDM seems to 
lie in the fact that clinicians were unaware of their lack 
of competency regarding SDM [36] (p.92). 
 
As a result, non-mediative decision-making frequently 
occurred, leading to the conclusion that: 
 
… the Multi-Disciplinary Team in its current form is a 
potential barrier to implementing SDM, as quite often, 
despite the preference-sensitive decisions, only one 
treatment option was recommended [36] (p.97). 
 
This can be taken as further support for the contention 
that attempting to insert an inter-vdr decision aid into a 
standard vdr clinical (or clinical team) encounter cannot 
provide the basis for successful integration of explicitly 
elicited patient preferences into a multi-criterial decision. 
Only an inter-nac approach offers a realistic chance of 
success in this respect, assuming this aim is taken seriously 
as key to any construction of sdm. 
Michael Barry and colleagues have issued a reminder 
that sdm is a means to the end of better, higher quality, 
decision-making and must not become an end itself [38], a 
comment particularly pertinent to the suggestion that a 
shared decision is the only outcome that matters when it 
comes to evaluating evidence-based practice [39]. They 
noted that of those sent an ‘inter-vdr’ aid on PSA testing as 
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preparation for a clinical encounter, 43% stated they no 
longer needed a consultation. The authors suggest that their 
decision should be respected. Agreed - but why not reverse 
the process and offer a direct-to-user apomediative aid, 
which can become apo-intermediative if the person 
decides? 
As Eysenbach notes, whether consumers prefer an 
apomediation or intermediation approach, is highly 
situation-specific and key variables in determining 
consumer preference are autonomy, self-efficacy and 
knowledge in a specific area [17]. But if people do not 
know of, or have available, apo-nac decision support tools 
they cannot develop an informed preference for or against 
them.  
Eddy has often pointed out numbers were the language 
developed to deal with magnitudes and if we do not have 
good numbers today, it is because we did not ask the right 
questions yesterday [40]. Those who wish to use words to 
quantify magnitudes, rather than numbers, should 
acknowledge that this is a matter of preference, nothing 
more, and no more or less ‘reductionist’. 
The future will be characterised by widespread 
apomediation based on the digital technologies that are 
transforming the ability of individuals to access 
information about themselves through wearables and home 
kits and so self-produce their health. The intermediative 
constructs of sdm will be re-interpreted as the 
intermediative constructs of health co-creation [41]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While applauding much of the activity occurring under the 
sdm label and the research being undertaken within the 
field, those involved seem largely unaware that sdm, as a 
formative constuct, is being formed in the acts of research 
and implementation and necessarily reflects a set of 
preferences, value judgements and interests. As 
emphasised repeatedly, this does not undermine their 
usefulness, far from it, but it does make them suspect 
unless and until the interests underlying the determining 
preferences are acknowledged and disclosed. 
The current dominance of what we are calling the inter-
vdr construction of sdm continues largely unchallenged 
and its grounding in a particular set of preferences 
unnoticed and unacknowledged. These particular 
preferences are associated with interests of various sorts 
among the providers who, by the definition of 
intermediation, are responsible for the construct and the 
development of the decision support provided within it. 
There can be no objection to the dominance of inter-vdr 
except if it is used, either overtly or covertly, to deny 
access to the alternative constructs and decision support 
tools that would be appropriate to those with other 
preferences. In a publicly-resourced service the only 
arguments for denying these alternative forms to those who 
would prefer them are economic. There is a therefore a 
strong case for the rigorous, fair and comprehensive 
evaluation of all the main constructs of sdm, that is, 
evaluation in which particular interests and preferences do 
not bias the measures of cost and effectiveness in such a 
way as to guarantee the overall result is in their favour. 
The observable domination of ethics committees by 
deontological proponents of inter-vdr sdm will need to be 
overcome in order to ensure unbiased comparative 
evaluation can be undertaken. 
The test of a Centre or Society for Shared Decision 
Making is whether it embraces the diverse preference-
sensitive constructs of sdm, including provider-
independent apomediation via decision support tools based 
on numerical analytical calcuation, as well as provider-
dependent intermediative decision aids based on verbal 
deliberative reasoning. In other words, a Centre for Shared 
Decision Making should not misrepresent itself in a way 
equivalent to a Centre for Shared Love Making restricting 
itself to ‘straight‘ heterosexual relationships, denying the 
diversity of sexual preferences. Providing balanced support 
for the preference-sensitive meta-decision of selecting one 
construct of sdm from an uncensored and balanced menu 
should be an important focus of such a centre or society. 
Finally, in relation to the message from Victor Montori 
and colleagues [7], the response must be that the answer 
will never, and can never, be in. What can be pursued are 
the multiple answers for the multiple constructs of sdm that 
reflect the diverse preferences of a heterogeneous 
population. 
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